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**PROBLEMS OF COUNTERACTION TO CORRUPTION IN
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND SOCIETY**

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Abstract

The problems of counteraction to the corruption in the Russian Federation are analysed. The authors chose the attitude of the authority to the society as an object of the research. The authors undertook the attempt to not only show the negative effect of corruption illegal actions, but also to determine the main direction of counteraction, including by means of expert institutions and other forms of influence of civil society on the processes of minimisation of the corruption in Russia. Activation of the struggle with corruption is determined by actualisation of the most important functions of expert institutes. These functions include provision of open, reliable information for government agencies; assistance in the early diagnostics and assessment of possible consequences of the made decisions; giving opportunity to the government bodies to extend the information and organisation base of solutions; reaching publicity and other groups of interests or, on their behalf, the government bodies. Besides, there is mediation between citizens and government institutions; involvement of citizens, public organisations in participation in specific political, socio-economic urgent questions; consolidation of the public order; legitimation of political, socio-economic solutions. In addition, they can include attaching legitimacy to state-social life and activity of government bodies; provision of the channel of interaction between “citizens and social structures”, “science and state”, “business structures and government bodies”, expression of public differentiation, the formal lobbying of objectively existing groups of interests on the government bodies and many others. These and other aspects of the problem have been reflected in this paper.

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Keywords: Corruption, authority and business, civil society, expert institutes.



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1. Introduction

In the national aspect, counteraction against corruption, stated by the president on the 31st of July 2008, it is noted that corruption, despite the undertaken measures, still impedes considerably normal functioning of all public mechanisms, prevents from conducting social transformations and increase of the effectiveness of the national economy, causes a serious alarm and distrust to government institutes, creates a negative image of Russia on the international arena and is considered rightfully as one of the threats of the national security of the Russian Federation (Bilinskaya et al., 2011).

In February 2008, president Putin V.V. called the state apparatus as a “corrupted system”. By that, the head of the Russian state admitted that the staff that he had selected, appointed and recommended to State Duma, Council of Federation, Legislative Assembly had not justified his trust. And in fact, for the loss of trust, many officials of high range were fired, among whom there are members of government, governors, mayors of large cities.

A public-political journal “Rossiyskaya Federatsiya segodnya” (“Russian Federation today”) published the following corrupted “price list”. For obtainment of a state order, it was necessary to pay up to 20% of the sum; for the post in the party list – from 2 to 5 mln. dollars; for consideration of a draw law by the State Duma - \$250 thous. For the line in the state budget, accountable officials required “bribe” up to 3% of the project sum. For receiving and prolongation of the licenses, as well as withdrawal of the license from competitors, one was obliged to pay \$1-5 mln. for their own services, officials forced one to pay up to 10% of the overall profit, for abatement in fees – 30-50% of the sum, for which duties were abated, for writing off the back taxes – from \$1000 to 30-50% of the sum. Some of judges already prescribed the “price list “: for winning an arbitration proceeding - 10% of the protected sum (Sycheva, 2008).

In all federal ministries and departments, covered by prosecutor’s checks, the facts of violation of the legislation requirements by the office workers on submitting declarations on profits and property to tax bodies, and certificates on upholding the restrictions, connected with replacement of the state post – to corresponding staff services have been confirmed. The General Prosecutor also revealed violations of the legislation concerning public service and counteraction the corruption in the Federal Customs Service, other central bodies of authorities and control. It stated that over the last years, the number of revealed crimes of corrupted nature have increased, which were committed by the heads of administrations, management supervisors of federal and regional authorities.

Thus, corruption at the end of the first term of presidency of V.V. Putin became comprehensive and systemic and, as a consequence, the main barrier for political, economic, and spiritual revival of Russia. Having become actually one of the mechanisms of functioning of the state, an inherent constituent of its interrelations with oligarch business, corruption generated monstrous disproportions in the system of the state management and functioning of state institutes.

Thinking over the phenomenon of thriving corruption in the periods of 2000 - 2008, especially in higher echelons of authorities, where officials began to steal in a large-scale, without fear of being trialed, let us conclude that one of the valid reasons is that elite officials seemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of legal bodies. Namely in this period, a new criminal procedure code of the Russian Federation (CPC of RF) was ratified, regulating the order of criminal legal procedure on the territory of the Russian

Federation, where a separate from the ordinary citizens order of bringing high-rank official persons to criminal liability, including those caught during corruption. In other words, legally, a special order of investigation of criminal cases in respect to new Russian nomenclature was adopted. The codex signed in those years, includes a special chapter about immunity of a significant category of state officials of high rank of authority and legal bodies.

Corruption in Russia has infected with its metastases not only the middle management staff, but also a high echelon of authority. This is justified by multiple arrests of high-rank officials, involved in corruption, “bribes” and graft. Even ministers, members of Russian government (jurisdiction minister V.A. Kovalev, head of Minatom E.Adamov, minister of communication lines V. Aksenenko, minister of economic development A. Ulyukaev, etc.).

Two decades ago, bribes equal to a million dollars, corruption of government members and political activists would shock Russian people. Nowadays, it is not a surprise for anyone. Russian citizens witness this almost daily and take it for granted, as inevitable evil. Corruption disturbs them only when they become victims. “People unwillingly reconcile with imperfection of authorities: in the Duma there is corruption, in the ministries – corruption, in courts – corruptions, in the army and in police there is the same situation...”, wrote famous journalist Aleksandr Minkin (Minkin, 2010).

Among the causes of corruption growth, there are the radical social-economic and political reforms, conducted in recent years, negative economic, social-political and other factors, determining corruption as their consequence. Expenses and errors, made during reforms, weakening of the state and public control over public servants, absence of necessary legislation base turned the threat of corrupt of many bodies of state control into reality.

Against the background of repletion of national and foreign mass media with revelatory materials about abuses of high-rank official persons and public figures, it is possible to observe the aggravating tiredness of the corrupted authority. In contrast to that, among wide strata of population, awareness of civil responsibility for counteraction to corrupted stereotypes takes place.

With large-scale corruption, competitive mechanisms of market are destroyed since the winner is not one who produces innovation production, but one who was able to gain more advantages for bribes. Harm made by corruption leads not only to economic, financial and material losses, but also to mass human victims. As it happened to, for instance, in stanitsa Kushchevskaya of Krasnodar Krai, Gus-Khrustalnyi city, Vladimir region, Volgodonsk city of Rostov region and other regions of Russia. These tragic events showed that today in Russia the government bodies, called for conducting anticorruption struggle, are infected with corruption: office of public prosecutor, militia, courts, special services.

After desintegration of the USSR and its former system of anticorruption counteraction, new mechanisms, adequate to changed political, economic and other conditions, unfortunately, were not created timely. Because of that, mass robbery of public property with application of corruption techniques and schemes began. Very soon, corruption schemes became built-in the anew created system of state control.

At the initial stage of economy transformation, in the transitional period from socialism to capitalism, corruption in Russia was often an “instrument” of bloodless transformation of society, mobilization of elites and activation of progressive reforms. One of the main ideologists of the

transitional period, E.T. Gaidar wrote about it, “ If the path to the market was not, as sweet as honey – paved with dollars for nomenclature, then it hardly step onto it voluntarily and the country would hardly pass this path peacefully, bloodlessly.” (Gaydar, 1994). Thus, manipulations with property and corruption were considered by the authorities, having come to power in Russia in the early 1990s, as important instruments of transformation of socio-economic system.

Under conditions of transformation, corruption became a mechanism of formation of socio-political groups of supporting the regime. A classic example – pawn auctions, which in the opinion of many, became an act of distribution of the fattest pieces of economic branches to future oligarchs, social powers capable to provide the victory of B.N. Eltsin at the president elections of 1996.

The change of the socio-economic relations happened in Russia was accompanied by active interference of criminal structures in the political process and their building into the political system. There is substantiation to it and the whole stratum of reasons. Social chaos started as a result of desintegration of the USSR, conditioned the orientation to the powers and organisations, possessing good organisation and free financial means, including to “shadow entrepreneurs”, criminal authority and corrupted bureaucracy. Such strategic solution predetermined provision of favourable political-legal conditions for them, ignoring temporal, as it seemed to creators of this approach, extremely high public danger of this type of crime.

Until a certain moment in new Russia, a pseudo-liberal idea prevailed, stating that privatisation will legalize shadow capitals, create a new class of proprietors, lead to renewal of production, cease mass robbery of property. The course of events in the sphere of economic relations and their assessment in the criminal categories (structure, level and intensity of organised criminal activity) showed the fallacy of such position. During harmful restructuring and criminal reforming, Russia when transiting to the capitalist system of relations in the characteristics of Russian criminality, a number of specific peculiarities and tendencies emerged. The main of them consisted in the fact that corruption penetrated to the whole vertical of the executive authority. Almost in all spheres of government activity, where financial and other material resources were distributed, there was abuse of their status by officials. According to data of checks of one only Court of Auditors of RF, in 1998, 51 bn. rub. of budgetary funds was not used by designation, which is comparable with annual expenditures on defense or education, health protection, culture and social payments taken together.

The problems and conditions, generated corruption in the early 90s of the XX century in Russia in large scales, are reduced to the following:

1. Difficulties of overcoming the heritage of totalitarian period. They include, first of all, slow departure from closeness and uncontrolled authority, which undoubtedly facilitated the flourishing of corruption.
2. Natural division of labour between authority institutions, called for creation of conditions for normal functioning of economy, and free agents of market, was not formed. Administrative bodies in Russia began to play on the economic field by the rules, which they established themselves. Such situation inevitably generates corruption.

And today, transformations in Russia occur with preservation of the corrupted part of the body of government servants. At that, many of those who were not able to adapt to new conditions and start their

own business or apply in it their own talent, professionalism, at the worst – connections – remained on their posts. It means that not the best of them remained. The bearers of old, earlier described stereotypes of closeness of authority and possibility of interference in all spheres of life remained. Simultaneously those who saw rich opportunities of gaining personal profits from administrative powers.

3. Inability of the state to provide state officials with adequate salary pushed both to abuses, leading to mass local corruption. This was supported by old soviet traditions of “profitable connections” as one of the forms of local corruption.

4. Immaturity and imperfection of legislation.

The State Duma adopted the draft of the Federal law “On the struggle with corruption” twice, but it did not become a law because RF president, B.N. Eltsin vetoed it twice. Immaturity of legislation revealed itself simply in bad quality of laws, in imperfection of the entire legal system, in fizziness of legislative procedures. In this case, different kinds of corruption are generated:

- Inconsistency of legislation and even separate laws, which allows officials to create for themselves ideal conditions for blackmailing money from clients, asking for state services.

- Incompleteness of laws, abundant with ambiguity, gaps, multiple dispatch norms. As a result, finishing the legislative regulation was shifted to sublegal acts of executive authority bodies, preparation of which was practically uncontrolled. Thus, conditions for revealing ambiguous, “close”, inaccessible instructions, creating additional conditions for corruption appeared.

- Absence of legally established procedures of preparation and accepting normative and other regulating and administrative acts (laws, president’s decrees, government regulations, etc.), which substantially facilitated the possibilities for corruption. All this was aggravated by the general negligence to the procedural strictness. By the admittance of deputies of the State Duma, over 80% of legal drafts were prepared by officials, the major part of whom was corrupted in one way or another.

5. Ineffectiveness of the authority institutions. Bureaucratic structures adapt well to survival during the worst tragedies, at that the greater the transformation and reforms (including administrative), the more inventiveness demonstrates the official apparatus for its own preservation. As a result, surrounding life changes, but bureaucratic institutions and, consequently, the management system lag from these changes.

6. Weakness of civil society, immaturity of democratic institutions. A democratic state is capable of solving its own problems only in cooperation with institutes of civil society. Worsening of the socio-economic state of citizens, always accompanying the initial stages of modernisation, caused by these disenchantment, coming in replacement of former hopes, - all this facilitates alienation of society from authority, isolation of the latter. Meanwhile, neither local nor national corruption can be suppressed without the efforts of social organisations.

7. Penetration of corruption into politics facilitates:

- immaturity of democratic and competitive political culture, which is reflected, in particular, on the process of election, when electorate vote for cheap gratification or yielded to notorious demagogy;

- backwardness of party system, when the parties are unable to take responsibility for preparation and promotion of their staff;

- imperfection of election legislation, which protects exceedingly the deputy status, not providing real dependence of elected persons on electorate, provoking abuses when financing election campaigns. By that, subsequent corruption of representative bodies of authorities is laid already at the stage of elections.

Real political competition serves a counterbalance or limitation for corruption in the political sphere, on the one hand, and for political extremism – on the other. As a result, the chances of political instability are reduced.

8. Besides weak observation of laws and other legal acts, the absence of culture and tradition of using the right by citizens, other effects are revealed: in particular, the lowering of legal immunity leads to the situation when mass resistance of “local” corruption is almost absent.

9. Tradition of inobservance by officials of the law, but observance of the instructions and a director has originated in Russia long ago. This tradition and Russian bureaucratic mentality led to the fact that attempts of legal regulation get stuck in the old bureaucratic system, proceeding to work by their own laws, adopted several centuries ago. Consequently, any anticorruption programme in Russia must be combined with deep reforming of the system of government service and must be aimed at liquidation of bureaucratic traditions.

10. Privatisation of state property everywhere serves as a serious source of corruption. In Russia, this circumstance was aggravated by the large-scale privatisation and weakness of the control over its development. Involvement of officials in the number of shareholders was practiced.

11. Execution of the budget and distribution of budgetary means is one more favourable sphere for corrupt officials.

Thus, analysis of enumerated factors, predetermining the development of corruption in the system of relationships between state, business and its citizens allows making a number of conclusions as applied to modern Russia. In conditions of destruction of the former system of state control and absence of clear-cut laws, official became the masters of the situation. With absence of proper control, they began to trade by state services, referring to their low salary, as a rule.

Undoubtedly, proper salary is a necessary, but insufficient condition for preventing corruption. As practice shows, increase in the salary does not help to reduce the corruptibility of officials. In fact, if the problem consists in salary, then why it is necessary to file a suit against heads of state corporations by the facts of corruption, despite the fact that their salary sometimes reach 100 thous. euro a month?

It is known that for normal life activity of society, the presence of certain strata- elites - is important, as well as their influence on society, development of a political mechanism, reflecting the interests of the nation and organising it. Analysis of the Russian elite, factors, conditioning its activity, is long-standing needs since they facilitate rethinking of the accumulated both negative and positive experience of influence of the elite of Russian society on the corrupted processes and provision of the national security of the country.

Not only a high level of corruption but also a stable tendency to its growth cause uneasiness of political scientists and civil society. It is especially dangerous that corruption as many researchers and ordinary citizens think, has infected most of all the highest echelons of authority and law-enforcement agencies, called for struggle against corruption (Bogdanov, 2001). The high level of corruption of the Russian system of law-enforcement agencies, including court, prosecutor’s office, newly established

police is an obstacle on the path to the effective and uncompromising struggle against corruptibility of officials, political activists, representatives of state authority both in the centre and at the local levels. Not only false human power policy, preserving law-enforcers-corrupt officials at high posts, but also imperfection of the legislative base of the state facilitate it.

Corruption norm of the right expresses predominantly the interests of only several corporations, which “bought its adoption”. Such use of the right can be considered conditionally as “privatisation”. Jurists call such phenomenon as “capture of the state”. Its origin was connected with the birth of the Russian oligarchy and absence of legal and open channels of representativeness of the interests, which transforms the process of adoption of administrative solution into a “black box”. It is possible to guess about what signals were fed to its “input”, what is at the “output”, but not to have any idea about how this decision was made (it is absolutely unknown what alternatives were proposed, and based on what criteria the selection among them was made).

One of the weighty reasons according to which Russian power structures are seriously infected by corruption of state apparatus consists in the fact that almost all private entrepreneurs have stimulus to break the law, attempting (and quite successfully) to overcome illegally the bureaucratic barriers on the path of gaining the profit. The multiple growth of bureaucracy in Russia, a large number of necessary and unnecessary and useless instructions, rules, directions, resolutions, orders, regulations and other products of creativity of inventive bureaucracy substantially hinders conducting business in Russia. By the terms of conducting business, Russia ranks 120th in the world. And to create favorable conditions for separately taken company, corporation, its owners search for bypasses and strive for stipulating acceptable conditions for themselves and for their business by means of bribes.

Corrupting officials at the local level, representatives of large business make successful attempts to “negotiate” with a necessary minister or even a member of government to bypass certain ban or win an important tender on state purchases. “When the number of such resolutions and limitations become too large, - notes researcher M. Olson” – eventually, private sector (since all or almost all representatives have stimulus to break the anti-market directions or to bribe officials) makes government corrupted and ineffective (Olson, 1998). Professor I.N. Barnits echoes him, “Instead of paying taxes, entrepreneurs pay politicians... almost every fourth construction is financed, according to the data of prosecutors, from illegal funds. About 20% of all state orders is distributed beyond official contest” (Bartsits, 2010).

One cannot but agree with such dismal conclusion. In fact today, there is almost no body of government power, the corruption services of which were not demanded by business. In distribution of Russian markets of corruption services, executive power predominates undividedly. 98,97 % of the total volume of the market of corruption services falls to its share. In the opinion of I.N. Barnits, corruption is a consequence of “excessive state interference in economy ... therefore counteraction to corruption must include a complex of measures, going far beyond the framework of the proper budgetary sphere and the sphere of state control.” (Bartsits, 2010). This conclusion is confirmed by the Russian reality. In the tragedies of the recent years, connected with human victims (catastrophe at Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric station, murder of the farmer’s family by the Tsapka band in the stanitsa Kushevskaya, crashing of the steam boat “Bulgagiya”, death of people during the fire in Perm club “Khromaya loshad”, etc.), miscalculations and omissions in the state control are reflected as in water drop both at the federal and

regional levels. Director of the Russian and Asian programmes of the institute of the world security Nikolay Zlobin noted in this regard that “tragedy in “Khromaya loshad” (Perm city, December 2009) showed complete wretchedness of Potemkin village, erected in Russia under the view of power. All state structure could violate the laws, they violated from rules of registration of the establishment up to collection of taxes, from labour legislation to architecture norms, from fire to sanitary control.... At that, there is no guarantees that any other organisation will not become the next victim of this state net made of bribes, patronage, irresponsibility, negligence of the law, nepotism and sycophancy” (Glagolev, Moiseyev, 2014).

The chairman of the public organisation “National anticorruption committee” K.V. Kabanov, concluding the twenty-year period of counteraction to corruption in the modern Russia, noted the following: “Corruption in Russia is not a criminal phenomenon. It is the most profitable business (300 bn. dollars a year), the basis of ideology of the majority of officials. The main reason in reflectivity of the power, its unaccountableness and illegality before the citizen and society. Besides, in Russia, as well as in the West, the concept “reputation” does not act and, correspondingly, there are no reputation risks. And this in its turn is the result of absence of real political competition, that is opportunity of the citizen or the community of people to influence political and social processes. Certainly, the top level corruption differs from local. Motivation for billionaires and officials – institutional greediness, and a public service is a work in a corporation. For a doctor, a teacher and any other local official, the motivation is an example of the director, stealing millions, low social protection, real understanding of the systemacy and generality of the phenomenon. Russian corruption differs from the West corruption as follows: in the West, corruption is initiated by the citizen to obtain more comfortable conditions; in Russia – by bureaucracy creating excessive functions, administrative barriers” (Kabanov, 2013).

It is necessary to note that corruption in modern Russia is not exhausted by direct bribery, but includes indirect problems: political corruption, nepotism, use of administrative resource, bribes when receiving state services, untranslatable into a foreign language “norms” of graft or the threshold of “immunity” by the sum or prominent name, etc.

2. Problem Statement

In the framework of the main problem of counteraction to corruption in Russia, the authors emphasise the role of the institutes of the civil society, in particular, expert groups, established not by power structures, but by the society itself, its most active part. The idea about relevance and complexity of functional representation of expert institutions in transparent processes of overcoming corruption in Russia and, the degree of its elaboration in scientific literature give grounds to claim about the problems of the following vector. First, the problematics is expressed in the contradiction between the objective need in effective expert institutes facilitating improvement of manageability of social processes and an insufficient level of conceptually-theoretical comprehension, which would facilitate provision of non-corruption solution of these problems at the levels of administration. Second, it includes inconsistency between the increasing significance of expert institutions during elaboration and adopting non-corruption managerial decisions and absence of state regulation of their activity.

3. Research Questions

The questions of the research are the following:

- to show the negative influence of mass corruption in power structures of Russia on the socio-political and economic development of the country;
 - to analyse the state of the struggle against corruption in Russia and reveal the main reasons of its ineffectiveness;
 - to show the place and role of the institutes of civil society in counteraction to corruption in modern conditions;
 - to consider expert institutes of civil society as one of the effective mechanisms on the path of perfection of multivectors in the problem field of relations between authority and society; to show the role of expert institutions in activation of struggle against corruption in power structures;
 - to single out essential characteristics and functions of social expertise in the modern system of power in Russia;
- to give a critical assessment of the forms of interaction between the groups of interests and the government in the system “society-expertise-state”, as well as of the level of expert potential of the business community.

4. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study consists in the fact that in the framework of this paper, it is necessary to determine the place and the role of expert institutions, which become not only one of the independent channels of influence of the society on the authority among other channels and ways of expression of group interests. The authors aimed also to reveal the most significant factors, influencing the effectiveness of social expertise in the modern system of power in Russia. Simultaneously there was an attempt to elaborate main recommendations and directions aimed at increasing the effectiveness of expert institutions performance, first of all, social expertise facilitating optimisation of state management of Russian society.

5. Research Methods

The basis for researching the problem of overcoming corruption and collaboration of the authority and society was fundamental works of classics of scientific thought on the wide range of problems, as well as modern works of foreign and national scientists on the questions of methodology and methods of formation of expert institutions and transparent processes of overcoming corruption and cooperation between authority and modern Russian society. The methods base on the system of dialectic cognition and system analysis. During research, the authors used a dialectical method, predetermining the study of phenomena in their constant development and interrelation. In the work, the methods of scientific knowledge, including methods of empirical and theoretical research, social methods of economic and statistical analysis with their various techniques, were used.

The authors show by the definite facts and arguments the degree of importance of expert institutions for reducing the level of corruption in Russia. The research showed that expert institutions,

first of all, social expertise can become one of the effective mechanisms on the path of perfecting multivectors in the problem field of relations between authority and society.

The expert system represents, on the one hand, a representative institute of group interests, a complex structure of interrelated state, public, and private institutions, providing interrelations between the society and authority bodies; on the other hand – a combination of forms, methods, mechanisms of interrelations of the group of interests, the subjects of expert activity themselves and the state; third – this is one of the most perfect, formalized, independent channels of interaction between society and power (Glagolev, Doroshenko, Moiseev, 2014).

The authors of the paper conceive that namely social expertise (subjects are represented by multi-sided groups of interests, active and successfully working public organisations, an independent intellectual (scientific) community, etc.; the object is the most significant (and/or) risky undertakings, projects, programmes, bills, regulations, documentation, different kinds of activity, goods and services, and many others) can become an effective channel in interrelation between society and authority.

Let us determine essential characteristics of social expertise:

a) it should be initiated by the public and have a legislative base for conducting and recording the results at the level of making decisions or the readiness of the authority for collaboration;

b) expert activity must be conducted with regard of knowledge of main predominant ideas, opinions, propositions of different groups of interests; the expert group must be able to assess, analyse main trends of the society on the whole or of separate social groups.

It is inadmissible in the activity, even if it is realised by highly professional specialists, to integrate only one's own ideas since they contain the interests of directly this specific expert group.

c) It is obligatory to present final substantiated expert conclusion with recommendations for persons, making decision (Tselutina, 2013).

Besides, in the opinion of authors, public expertise preforms the following main functions:

- establishment of correspondence of documentation (well documented authority's decisions, concerning life interests of society, for example, new laws, regulations, plans, projects, etc.) with acting legislation and normative acts; determination of correspondence of decisions with priorities of society; provision of authority bodies with necessary information; objective assessment of risks and possibilities of realisation of made decisions, etc.;

- determination of correspondence of the specific good or service with existing standards, norms and/or assessment of their quality;

- analysis and assessment of effectiveness of activity (that is, combination of processes and phenomena aimed at for instance solution of some social problem) from the viewpoint of efficiency of decision of the problem of involved expenditures and elaboration of recommendations on more effective methods of solution of specific problem;

- obtaining complex information on state of the problem (for instance, social): its specifics, dynamics, contribution of different agents in its solution, legislative basis and etc.;

- analysis of effectiveness of interaction of public, state, regional, municipal and business-structures;

- forecast of development of the situation (problem) in the nearest, middle term and long-term prospect. Forecasting scenarios of situation development.

Intermediacy, creation of atmosphere of trust among society, social organisations and authority, state structures, working in one sphere. The expert performs coordinating, correcting and special role functions, which proceed from orientation to the certain result. Involvement of full-right coparticipants of elaboration and main decisions is important.

- Expression of public differentiation.
- Transformation of interests into specific requirements.
- Concretization of democratic principles of participation in management.
- Imitation of pressure (lobbying) on the process of making managerial decisions.
- Attracting citizens to participation in specific important political events.
- Consolidation of social order and/or control.
- Attaching legitimacy to state-social life and activity of authority structures.

Different projects of monitoring legislative and lawmaking activity, conducted by the structures of civil society, are not unique; they are performed in many regions and by many noncommercial and public organisations. But summary effect of participation of such structures of civil society in formation of legislative federal, regional and local levels seems insufficient. Priorities of executive power and large business dominate in the modern legislative process; too often state activity is self-reliant and alienated from real needs and expectations of citizens. The result is growth of corruption in the state administration and in society on the whole, not the solution, but deepening of important problems of society, business and state. High-rank officials in Russia often lobby the adopting such laws which include profitable legal norms for them or for some corporations. Civil society practically does not have possibilities to counteract to acceptance of such legislative decisions; it is hard to oppose the activity of such officials after adopting laws that are profitable to them. This situation forms divergence in the norms of the right and norm of moral. And therefore, the most substantial by the damage for society cases of using official authorities in personal interests or narrow corporative interests are frequently committed without abusing norms of the law at all, these laws were lobbied by the same interests.

In the modern system of authority in Russia, the limitation of such kind of corruption, connected with the legislative and lawmaking process can be the will of the RF president or public participation in this process, not expected from the RF president solution of all problems, citizens and associations of citizens, different groups of interests must lobby their interests and priorities more actively in the authority, achieving corresponding legislative decisions aimed at lowering the level of corruption in Russia. Therefore, development of practice of public expertise of legal acts and other decisions of state and municipal bodies of authority as one of the ways of participation of citizens in management of state affairs must become the necessary element of democratic development of Russia.

6. Findings

Thus the conducted study shows that corruption in modern Russia, owing to a number of reasons (absence political will of the head of the state, observance of recommendations of UNO convention “Against corruption” ratified by the Russian Federation in 2006, gaps in legislation, containing loopholes

for corrupted schemes, insufficient tough punishment for illegal enrichment up to confiscation of property and etc. have led to unusual flourish of corruption and its mass scales.

In conditions when the state practically does not use political mechanisms of reducing corruption, the experience of other states (Singapore, Dania, Finland, etc.) in reducing its scales, preventing from development of Russia, the institutes of civil society try to change the existing situation. By means of different forms and methods, the authors single out the work of expert institutions, making reasonable conclusion that owing to them it is possible to improve the anticorruption legislation. In the authors' opinion, functional representation of institutions of expertise is possible exclusively on the basis of cooperation of initiative groups of interests, authorities of all levels and representatives of business. Arrangement of the dialogues implies clear determination of the goal and the subject of discussion, the kind of the dialogue, its participants, as well as the role of authority and business in the cooperation. The authority bodies are considered as an organiser and a mediator, as well as a coparticipant and a partner. Expert potential of business communities must be aimed at not lobbying private interests (for example, so-called optimisation of taxation) and used for solution of relevant social and economic problems. Society has to become more mature up to intellectual independence with regard to expertise and its results. Changes for the better are possible only with subsequent democratization of public life and the political system, which will give the society more efficient means of control and mechanisms of representation in administration. Then, under this condition in addition to state and corporate order, it will be possible to form public order for science and expertise, the necessity in which is perceived more acutely.

In many aspects, namely institution of public expertise can be considered as an indicator of a qualitatively new level of interaction of authority and structures of civil society: on the one hand, it confirms actual maturity and big potential of social sector, on the other hand – demonstrates constructive approaches to realisation of principles of democratic management, social dialogues and cooperation. Namely achievements of educational community and scientific environment, consolidation of civil loyalty, transparency of management, and cultivation of principles of solidarity of society promise to become for Russia a pledge of well-off future, in which expertise institutions will be effective regulators of civil society.

7. Conclusion

For the purpose of effective business and creative cooperation of all kinds of expert organisations and structures, increase of the level of expert activity, stimulating potential experts from the number of representatives of intellectual community in regulation, improving the status of the expert, it is necessary: to establish associations of expert structures of Russian Federation (with different forms of privacy), Russian expert public league; legitimation of the expert communities; formation of the data bank of possible “subjects-participants” in different kinds of expert activity.

Awareness of the necessity of regulation and institutionalization of expert activity at the federal level will allow one in future at all levels of administration to build the mechanisms able to openly express consolidated opinion of the groups of interests, civil structures on relevant questions of state and socio-economic policy; to create the system of global social control and civil participation.

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